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Abstract
This paper is a comment on Ahani v. Canada (OCA). Ca-
nadian courts are presently involved in a dialogue over
the role of international law domestically. The courts’
own grappling with various norms of international law,
however, has helped to clarify and reinforce the status of
these norms. In Baker v. Canada, the Supreme Court gave
a new prominence to the “persuasive approach” of ap-
plying international law. Ahani demonstrates that while
the persuasive approach has begun to be internalized into
Canadian law, the courts are still at odds with how per-
suasive international law should be. To complicate this ac-
count, the Supreme Court’s discussion in Suresh of
peremptory norms of international law demonstrates that
an over-emphasis on the “persuasive” approach can in
fact weaken the role of international law domestically. At
the same time, the dialogue within the courts is linked to
a much more general dialogue. The importance of cases
such as Ahani ultimately stretches beyond the domestic
context.
Résumé
Cet article est un commentaire sur le cas Ahani c. Cana-
da. Les tribunaux canadiens sont actuellement engagés
dans une discussion sur le rôle du droit international au
plan domestique. Cependant, les efforts-mêmes de ces ins-
tances pour essayer de comprendre et maîtriser diverses
normes du droit international ont servi à éclaircir et à
renforcer ces normes. Dans Baker c. Canada, la Cour Su-
prême a donné une nouvelle importance à « l’approche
persuasive » dans l’application du droit international. Le
cas Ahani démontre qu’alors que l’approche persuasive a
commencé à être adoptée par le droit canadien, les tribu-
naux ne sont toujours pas d’accord sur la question de sa-
voir jusqu’où doit aller la persuasion en droit
international. Pour compliquer les choses, la discussion
de la Cour Suprême dans le cas Suresh sur les normes pé-
remptoires en droit international montre que trop d’em-
phase sur l’approche « persuasive » peut en fait affaiblir
le rôle du droit international à l’intérieur du pays. Il faut
noter par la même occasion que cette discussion à l’in-
térieur des tribunaux est liée à une discussion bien plus
générale. En fin de compte, l’importance de cas tel que
celui d’Ahani s’étend bien au-delà du contexte domes-
tique.
On the night of June 18, 2002, Mansour Ahani, anIranian Convention refugee and suspected terro-rist, was deported from Canada to Tehran. This
marked the end of his nine-year battle to prevent his depor-
tation,  which saw his case reach the  Supreme  Court of
Canada on two occasions. In his first case, Mr. Ahani chal-
lenged a deportation order made by the Canadian govern-
ment, on the ground that he would face a serious risk of
torture were he to be returned to his native Iran.1 He claimed
that the prohibition on torture in international law is non-
derogable and therefore superseded any provisions in the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees that would allow
for the refoulement of refugees.2 Mr. Ahani’s appeal to the
Supreme Court was ultimately dismissed. The Court ruled
that whereas Mr. Ahani had been given the proper proce-
dural protections to prove his case, he had failed to establish
that he faced a substantial risk of torture if deported. As he
had exhausted all of his rights of review, it was now open to
the Canadian government to deport Mr. Ahani.
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In a last effort to prevent his removal from Canada, Mr.
Ahani filed a “communication” with the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (the Committee) for relief un-
der the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant of
Civil Political Rights (the Optional Protocol).3 His claim
was based on Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol. These articles,
respectively, call on signatory states to recognize the com-
petence of the Committee, and to allow for individuals to
bring claims once they have exhausted all available domes-
tic remedies.4 The Committee made an “interim measures”
request that Canada stay the deportation order until it had
considered Mr. Ahani’s communication.5
The Optional Protocol of the ICCPR has been ratified by
Canada but not implemented into Canadian law. By rati-
fying the Optional Protocol, state parties agree to recognize
the Committee. However, since the language of the Proto-
col and the Committee’s rules of procedures are permissive,
the Committee is only empowered (under the Optional
Protocol and the Rules of Procedure) to express its views
and make requests to state parties. In this sense, parties are
not legally bound to yield to the committee’s requests or
findings. Given the permissive language of the Protocol, the
Canadian government took the view that the interim mea-
sures request was not binding and, as a result, chose not to
accede it, wishing again to deport Mr. Ahani immediately.
Mr. Ahani applied to the Superior Court of Ontario for an
injunction to restrain his deportation pending the Com-
mittee’s consideration of his communication. The effect of
such an injunction would have been to force the Canadian
government to follow the Committee’s request. The central
question in Ahani II then was whether Canada was bound
– either on the principles of the Charter of Rights  and
Freedoms or of international law – by the procedures of a
ratified but non-implemented international  instrument,
notwithstanding the fact that the relevant procedures are
permissive only.
This question was ultimately answered in the negative.
Both the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal of Onta-
rio denied the request of Mr. Ahani for an injunction. His
application for leave to appeal was further dismissed 2-1 by
the  Supreme Court of  Canada on May  16, 2002.6 This
cleared the way for his deportation. Mr. Ahani’s fate since
his return to Iran is uncertain. What is more certain, how-
ever, is that his attempts to stay his deportation will help to
shape how Canadian courts conceive of and apply interna-
tional law in future cases. Of particular significance are the
majority and dissenting judgments of the Court of Appeal.
What we see emerge from those respective judgments is the
continuation of an ongoing debate within the courts that is
in fact part of a reconceptualization of the role of interna-
tional law. The purpose of this paper is to examine that
debate in more detail and how Ahani II fits into it. The
significance of this debate is underscored by looking to
other recent Canadian cases that address issues of interna-
tional law. What we shall see, ultimately, is that the impact
of Ahani II resonates beyond the domestic context.
The starting point of my analysis is the case of Baker v.
Canada.7 In that case, we are presented with competing
visions of the relationship between international law and
domestic courts. At issue in Baker was the deportation order
of Ms. Baker, the mother of four dependant Canadian-born
children, who had remained in Canada without legal status
for over a decade. The issue, with respect to international
law, was whether Canadian immigration officials had to
give primary consideration to the interests of Ms. Baker’s
children when exercising their discretion on whether to
issue a deportation order. The language of “the primary
interest of the child” is found in the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, a convention that Canada has ratified but never
implemented into domestic law.8 As Knop points out, there
are essentially three different views of international law at
play in Baker. First, there is Iacobucci J.’s minority
judgment that takes a strict or traditional view of how the
domestic courts can apply international law. On this view,
“an international convention ratified by Canada is of no
force or effect until its provisions have been incorporated
into domestic law by way of implementing legislation.”9
By contrast, the lawyers for Ms. Baker and two of the
interveners took the view that international law should be
applied by “default.” On this view, “the legislature is presu-
med to comply with international law” and, as a result,
statutes and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be
interpreted to comply, as much as possible, with interna-
tional conventions, “regardless of whether the conventions
have been incorporated by domestic legislation.”10 In other
words, on this view, upon ratification, a treaty or conven-
tion is not only binding on Canada as a matter of interna-
tional law, but domestic law should then be interpreted so
as to  conform to that instrument. Finally, the majority
judgment introduces a view that fits not entirely within
either of these two positions. On the one hand, L’Heureux-
Dubé  J. follows on  previous rulings that “international
treaties are not part of Canadian law unless they have been
implemented by statute.”11 On the other hand, she also
takes the view that non-implemented conventions that Ca-
nada has ratified do play a role in domestic law. On her
view, international human rights law can be used as a tool
to “help inform the contextual approach to statutory inter-
pretation and judicial review.”12
The view that international law can inform a court’s
interpretation of domestic law, particularly the Charter,
had been recognized prior to Baker.13 Baker is a good star-
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ting point for examining the debate over international law,
however, to the extent that the stricter traditional view does
not prevail.14 One could say that L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s ma-
jority decision marks a new-found prominence for the
“persuasive” approach. It is an affirmation on the part of
the Court  that ratified international  law should not be
relegated solely to those cases where a treaty or convention
has been implemented. As we shall see, Ahani II is signifi-
cant because it demonstrates that the issue of how persua-
sive these non-implemented instruments should be is far
from resolved. The role of the Canadian courts in interna-
tional law can thus be seen as one of debate or dialogue – a
dialogue that has a two-fold effect. First, in addressing the
applicability of international law, the courts are better e-
nunciating the evolving relationships between internatio-
nal and domestic law (whereas before the role of
unimplemented ratified treaties may have been considered
inconsequential). Second, to the extent that the courts are
grappling with these issues, they are playing a role in inter-
nalizing the values or principles of international law. In
other words, the mere exercise of examining these issues
may also have the effect of reinforcing the principles that
the courts are trying to elucidate.15
The traditional reading of international law in Iacobucci
J.’s judgment in Baker is fairly easily grasped. In short, on
that judgment, international law is only binding on Cana-
dian courts when incorporated into domestic law by way of
an implementing legislation. In other words, non-incorpo-
rated ratified international conventions have no force or
effect in Canadian law. One could then ask whether this
view simply reduces international law to domestic law, i.e.
whether international law only exists as a function of do-
mestic law.16 However, without delving too far into that
issue, we can see how Iacobucci J.’s judgment relegates the
role of Canadian courts solely to arbiters of domestic law
and, in the process, establishes a clear division between
what is binding as a matter of domestic law and what may
be binding as a matter of international law. In this case,
Iacobucci J. gave no legal authority to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child because there was no mechanism,
through the domestic courts or otherwise, for binding Ca-
nada as a matter of domestic law to the non-implemented
convention. Any discussion of international law ended the-
re. The final implication of this judgment, then, is that in
choosing not to implement the Convention on the Rights of
the Child into domestic law, Canada is free domestically to
do what it wants with this and other non-implemented
international “obligations.”17 In other words, despite their
prior ratification, Canada need only follow – as a matter of
domestic law – various non-implemented conventions
when it is in Canada’s interest to do so.
The more traditional reading of international law by
Iacobucci J. in Baker is also reflected in the majority
judgment of Ahani II. The issue of bindingness is one-step
removed in this case, however. Similar to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, the Protocol has also been ratified
but not implemented into Canadian law. The difference
arises because the relevant provisions of the Protocol are
non-binding. As we have seen, the powers of the Human
Rights Committee are framed in permissive terms. This
difference proved ultimately to be a decisive consideration.
Writing for the majority, Laskin J.A. did not to give any
weight to the Committee’s request to stay the deportation.18
In the first place, citing the majority judgment in Baker,
Laskin J.A. reiterates the view that international treaties
such as the Protocol are “not part of Canadian law unless
they have been incorporated into Canadian law.”19 More
important, given the absence of any provisions for making
the Optional Protocol formally binding, whether as a mat-
ter of international or domestic law, Canada was free to
disregard the Committee’s request. The matter was entirely
within Canada’s discretion and Canada could deport the
appellant as it wished. The further question then was
whether Canadian law – in particular, the principles of
fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter – went beyond
the obligations of the Protocol, so as to bind Canada to the
Committee’s request. Once again, Laskin J.A. followed the
Supreme Court’s lead in Ahani I and took the view that the
appellant had been given the proper procedural protections
to  present his case.20 Mr.  Ahani’s  deportation was thus
consonant with the principles of fundamental justice.
By not giving any weight to a ratified but non-implemen-
ted instrument, albeit a non-binding  one, Laskin J.A.’s
judgment might be seen as a step away from L’Heureux-
Dubé J.’s understanding of international law in Baker. On
my view, however, we can still situate the majority decision
of Ahani II within the ongoing dialogue about the role of
international law in Canada. In the first place, Laskin J.A.
does not ignore the persuasive role of international law. He
merely takes the appellant’s position to be extending the
reach of international law too far. On Laskin J.A.’s view, to
adopt the appellant’s position would be to interpret s. 7 of
the Charter in such a way as to make a non-binding, as
opposed to simply unimplemented, commitment binding.21
Now, whether or not this is an accurate reading of how the
appellant sought to invoke the Optional Protocol is deba-
table. Indeed, the dissenting judgment is precisely at odds
with this view. Before we turn to that judgment, however,
it is important to note a further way that Laskin J.A. may
have been participating in the “dialogue.” The conclusion
of the majority judgment is that the federal government is
not bound by the Optional Protocol, as a matter of inter-
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national or Canadian law, and thus cannot be compelled to
implement it as a matter of domestic law. This decision was
backed by a well established line of precedents.22 Neverthe-
less, Laskin J.A. stayed the deportation to give the appellant
a chance to appeal to the Supreme Court. In so doing, the
majority may have been tacitly accepting that the final word
had yet to be pronounced on this matter. More generally,
by acknowledging that the Supreme Court may want to
weigh in on these issues, the majority may have been dis-
playing a certain awareness that the role of international law
is unsettled and constantly evolving.
Another element of the Ahani II case that points to an
ongoing dialogue about international law is the fact that
there was a dissenting judgment. Rosenberg J.A., in dissent,
took the view that the appellant had a right, under s. 7 of
the Charter, to have his deportation stayed pending review
by the Human Rights Committee:
However, I think there is a generally held consensus in Canada
that in the human rights context an individual whose security
is at stake should within reason be given the opportunity to
access remedies at the international level, and that necessarily
the executive should not unreasonably frustrate the individual’s
attempt to do so.23
Framed in these terms, Rosenberg J.A.’s understanding of
the issues in Ahani II appears to be extending the persuasive
role that L’Heureux-Dubé J. ascribes to ratified non-imple-
mented international conventions in Baker. According to
Rosenberg J.A., an order enjoining the appellant’s deporta-
tion would not bind the government to any decisions made
under the Protocol. Canada would still be free not to comply
with any decision of the Committee. Canada would not be
free, however, to disregard the jurisdiction that the federal
government has conferred upon the Committee by ratifying
the Protocol.24 In other words, even though the views and
requests of the Committee are not binding, Canada’s ratifi-
cation of the Optional Protocol helps to inform a more
robust understanding of the guarantees accorded under s. 7
of the Charter:
[The appellant] claims only the limited procedural right to
reasonable access to the Committee, upon which the federal
government has conferred jurisdiction. He submits that the
government, having held out this right of review, however
limited and non-binding, should not be entitled to render it
illusory by returning him to Iran before he has a reasonable
opportunity to access it. I agree with that submission and that
it is a principal of fundamental justice that individuals have fair
access to the process in the Protocol.25
With these words, in effect, Rosenberg J.A. was either trying
to internalize the principles underlying the Optional Proto-
col’s obligations into the Canadian Charter, or was recogni-
sing that these principles have already been internalized.
One could query then whether Rosenberg J.A.’s decision
brings us closer to the third view in Baker, that international
law should be applied by default.26
Clearly, however, we are not at the stage where interna-
tional law will be applied by default, especially given that
Rosenberg J.A. was writing in dissent. Moreover, the Supre-
me Court ultimately dismissed the appellant’s application
for leave to appeal.27 This decision, however, was not wi-
thout its own dissent. L’Heureux-Dubé J. disagreed with
the ruling of Bastarache and Binnie JJ. that the Court not
weigh in on these issues.28 Since reasons are rarely given for
judgments in leave applications, one can only speculate as
to what guided the decisions of the respective judges. Did
the panel’s views parallel those of the Court of Appeal? That
is, was L’Heureux-Dubé J. swayed by the dissent of Rosen-
berg J.A.? Did she take the view that this was precisely a case
where the persuasiveness of international law should gua-
rantee greater procedural protections, a principle she so
strongly enunciated in Baker? Did Bastarache and Binnie
JJ., by contrast, simply follow the lead of Laskin J.A.’s more
restrained understanding of how international law should
be applied in this case? Again, this is just to speculate.29
The cases of Baker and Ahani II, however, do offer ques-
tions for more immediate discussion.  Might  Rosenberg
J.A.’s view, which can be seen to extend L’Heureux-Dubé
J.’s persuasive reading of international law in Baker, be-
come more prominent? Will this bring us closer to a default
view of international law  in the domestic  context?  The
answers to these questions are uncertain. They are impor-
tant because the more views like those of Rosenberg J.A.
become prominent, the more the courts will look to make
Canada comply with the international instruments that it
has ratified, whether they are implemented into Canadian
law or not, by reading the Charter and statutes in-line with
those instruments. What is more certain, though, is that the
courts are increasingly faced with these issues. As a result,
the courts have become engaged in a dialogue, by helping
to enunciate better what their role should be in applying
international law. In turn, they are helping this role to
evolve.30 They are helping to redefine Canada’s interaction
with international law and the relationship between the
courts and international law.
If one gives credence to the idea that there is a dialogue
within the Canadian courts over the role of international
law, then the next step would be to situate this debate within
a more general context. The case of Suresh is particularly
instructive in this respect.31 For the purposes of this discus-
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sion, the issue of note in that case is the Supreme Court’s
discussion of peremptory norms of customary internatio-
nal law (jus cogens). The Court’s examination of that issue,
on the one hand, serves as what is perhaps a cautionary tale
of invoking the persuasive understanding of international
law. In Suresh, the Court may have weakened the status of
peremptory norms in Canadian law. The Court’s general
discussion of peremptory norms, on the other hand, sug-
gests that the debate over international law in the courts
may have a more profound impact than I have suggested
until now. In short, this debate may actually transcend the
domestic context. In helping courts to internalize principles
of international law domestically, cases such as Ahani, Ba-
ker, and Suresh may also be reinforcing principles of inter-
national law generally or internationally.
Suresh was the most recent discussion by the Supreme
Court of the issue of peremptory norms. Indeed, this issue
is one that hovered over the second Ahani case, and that
was central to  the first. As a definition for peremptory
norms, the Court endorses in Suresh the definition contai-
ned in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties:
[A] norm accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation
is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character.32
Suresh and Ahani I were heard at the same time and the
Court used the analytical framework in Suresh to render
judgment on the issues in Ahani I.33 The particular norm in
question in both cases was the prohibition on deportation
to torture. The Court discusses the status of this norm in
Suresh when addressing the content of the principles of
fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter. The Court did
not pronounce definitively in Suresh on whether the prohi-
bition on deportation to torture has attained the status of a
peremptory norm, but suggested there was strong evidence
to that effect.34 At the same time, the Court’s discussion of
this prohibition provides some initial answers to more ge-
neral questions about the status of peremptory norms in
Canadian law. In particular, prior to Suresh, the Supreme
Court had yet to clarify whether judges could apply these
norms directly, as a matter of Canadian law or of interna-
tional law binding on Canada, or whether these norms had
somehow to be filtered through Canadian law.35
A central feature of peremptory norms of customary
international law, if we follow the definition endorsed by
the Court in Suresh, is that there can be no derogation or
modification of these norms (except by way of a subsequent
norm). At first blush then, the Court’s definition of pe-
remptory norms as being non-derogable appears to bear
some similarity to the “default view” of applying interna-
tional law that we saw in Baker.36 The Court’s discussion of
peremptory norms in Suresh, however, is ultimately much
more evocative of the persuasive understanding of interna-
tional law. Moreover, by giving peremptory norms merely
an informative or persuasive role, the Court may actually
ascribe a weaker role to peremptory norms, as a matter of
domestic law, than would be suggested by the Court’s own
definition. As a  basic  proposition,  the  Court begins  by
saying that international law can inform its decision.37 In
this case, the Court was concerned with which principle of
international law should guide its Charter interpretation, in
the face of an apparent conflict between various principles.
As we saw in Ahani I, the Court was looking at the interplay
between the prohibition on deportation to torture and the
right of states to refoule refugees in cases where security
interests are at stake. After an examination of the relevant
sources of international law, the Court concluded by en-
dorsing the prohibition against torture. In other words,
“the better view is that international law rejects deportation
to torture, even where national security interests are at
stake. This is the norm which best informs the content of
the principles of fundamental  justice under s.  7 of the
Charter.”38
Without passing judgment on the soundness of the
Court’s Charter analysis, we can quickly point to potential
shortcomings with how the Court treats peremptory
norms. We have seen that, on the Court’s own definition,
peremptory norms can only be derogated from or modified
by way of another such norm. By implication, this would
mean that peremptory norms would take priority over any
international treaty or domestic law. The force of peremp-
tory norms arises precisely because of the international
consensus required for them to take root. Once a norm has
been identified as a peremptory norm of international law
(which the Court seems to suggest is almost the case for the
prohibition on deportation to torture in Suresh), it would
be increasingly harder for an individual state to deviate
from that norm; i.e. to justify a law or practice different
from that of the international consensus. In this sense, the
individual state would be bound by the peremptory norm.
Domestic law and practices, inter alia, would thus be requi-
red to conform to the peremptory norm.39 The Court in
Suresh does not give as robust a status to peremptory
norms, however. As we have seen, on the facts of Suresh, the
discussion of peremptory norms by the Court is restricted
to its Charter analysis. This would perhaps not be so pro-
blematic had the Court stated, for example, that it is obliged
to interpret the Charter so as to conform with the prohibi-
tion against the deportation to torture – because of the
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peremptory norm’s status as a peremptory norm. Again,
this is not what the Court did. The Court only went so far
as to say that the prohibition informs Canadian courts in
their application of domestic law. Moreover, the prohibi-
tion does not ultimately take priority over Canadian law.
The Court allows for derogation from the prohibition in
certain rare cases, where national security is at risk. In so
doing, the Court was ostensibly saying that these norms do
not bind the courts.40
The Court’s discussion of the prohibition on torture thus
leaves us with somewhat conflicting conclusions. On the
one hand, the Court gives a strong recognition to the pro-
hibition on deportation to torture, as a matter of Canadian
law. After all, the Court states that the prohibition is vir-
tually non-derogable, making this perhaps the most deci-
sive factor in the Court’s Charter analysis. On the other
hand, peremptory norms are only treated as a tool or factor
for interpreting the Charter. What this would mean, at the
extreme, is that these norms could only play a role domes-
tically by virtue of previously established domestic law
(through which to inform and gain expression).41 One
could query then whether the persuasive view has become
too persuasive in Canadian courts. As we have seen, the
international consensus required for a norm to become
peremptory would suggest that these norms somehow su-
persede Canadian law, instead of merely informing it. This
raises the further question, in turn, of whether international
law will ever be accorded any independent priority over
Canadian domestic law. Indeed, by ascribing a persuasive
role to peremptory norms, the Court is able to skirt the
question, for example, of whether peremptory norms
should be considered part of Canadian law (e.g. as part of
the common law, or under its own heading), or part of a
higher order of law, to which Canadian law is subservient.42
For the time being, the final result of the Court’s decision
in Suresh may be that international law (peremptory norms
included) is only strictly binding on Canada, as matter of
Canadian law, by way of an implementing legislation. Any
other norm of international law, even those which carry the
consensus of the international community, will only be
given expression in Canadian law – however strong – by
virtue of its informative or persuasive value.43 This is pe-
rhaps a tacit disregard of the significance of an international
consensus. At the very least, the Court’s view of peremptory
norms of customary international law in Suresh may be
inconsistent with the definition that the Court first intro-
duces of those norms.
The Court’s discussion of peremptory norms is relevant
in another way to the dialogue in the courts of the role of
international law. As we have seen, the Court endorses, if
only equivocally, the prohibition of deportation to torture
as a peremptory norm of customary international law. It is
precisely this endorsement that allows us to see that the
debate in the courts over international law is inextricably
linked to a more general or international dialogue about the
role of international law. The Court outlines three indicia
in Suresh to help determine whether the prohibition on
torture has achieved the status of peremptory norm: mul-
tilateral instruments, domestic practices, and international
authorities.44 Now, it would be fairly safe to assume that
these indicia would apply to most investigations to deter-
mine the existence of a peremptory norm. Further, we can
assume for the purposes of this discussion that the decisions
of a domestic court can be placed in the category of “do-
mestic practices.”45 If this is the case, then by corollary, the
judgments of a high court will play a role in the deve-
lopment of a peremptory norm. In other words, a court’s
endorsement of a principle domestically will lend weight to
the view that there is an international consensus concerning
that principle. As we have seen, the Court specifically states
in Suresh that it was not being asked “to pronounce on the
status of the prohibition on torture in international law.”46
This statement, however, is perhaps a shrewd display of
self-awareness, on the part of the Court, of what it was
actually doing. Even though the Court did not affirm une-
quivocally whether the prohibition on torture is a peremp-
tory norm, the Court’s discussion of the status of the
prohibition, and subsequent strong endorsement of that
norm will only reinforce any emerging consensus about
that norm in the future.47
This endorsement, then, has a two-fold effect. First, it
internalizes an international norm, the prohibition against
torture, into domestic law  (although perhaps not in as
binding a way that a peremptory norm should be). In this
sense, the judgment in Suresh can be placed alongside the
decisions of L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Baker and of Rosenberg
J.A. in Ahani II. Second, the endorsement will also serve to
reinforce or “externalize” a norm at the level of internatio-
nal law. If one accepts this reading, then we see that the
development of international law, and of peremptory
norms, is a reflective process.48 As certain principles have
gained prominence internationally, they have been interna-
lized domestically, which has further reinforced those prin-
ciples internationally, which will then reaffirm the
principles domestically, and so on. The domestic and inter-
national fora are inextricably linked.
If we turn back to Ahani II, the ultimate effect of the
majority judgments of the Court of Appeal, and of the
Supreme Court at the leave stage, may be that the status of
the Optional Protocol of the ICCPR will be less firm or, at
the very least, no stronger than before. The provisions of
the unimplemented instrument will continue to have no
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formal binding effect domestically. Further, at the interna-
tional level, this will not assist in raising the principles
enshrined in the Optional Protocol to the level of a peremp-
tory norm, as was eventually the case with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, for example. Canada will be
able to maintain its status as a state party of the Optional
Protocol, yet continue to disregard any of the communica-
tions and requests of the UN Human Rights Committee
with near impunity.49 There may yet be hope, however, for
those who would wish to see the Canadian government
more formally bound to the pronouncements of the Com-
mittee.
As we have seen, the introduction and development of
the persuasive understanding of international law in the
Canadian courts has been a gradual process. The cases of
Baker and the dissent in Ahani II demonstrate that there is
a clear shift away from a purely traditional understanding
of international law, in the courts’ application of interna-
tional law. The courts are still struggling to delineate how
persuasive international law should be. In the case of Su-
resh, we see possible drawbacks of placing too much em-
phasis on the persuasive reading of international law. At the
same time, Suresh also shows how the courts’ decisions may
have more far-reaching implications. It provides a tacit
recognition by the Supreme Court that the role of the courts
cannot be seen as confined merely to the domestic process,
that their judgments themselves may be persuasive in rein-
forcing various norms internationally (a recognition that
may make the Court’s reluctance to apply peremptory
norms directly or more forcefully all the more troubling).
That is not to say that the development of international law
is a self-fulfilling prophecy. But by viewing the role of the
courts in these cases in terms of an ongoing dialogue, one
with definite international implications, we can see that
international law may only become better defined and, for
better or for worse, more persuasive in future cases.
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